Intelligence and National Security: Adjusting to a Post-Cold War Environment by Victor Jackovic
101
Intelligence and National Security:




George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
Current Environment
The post-Cold War environment is probably as challenging for
intelligence services as it is for the rest of us.  The demise of for-
mer structures - like the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia - stimulated discussion about the reorganization of
international associations such as NATO and OSCE.  Especially
with its enlargement into former Soviet bloc territory and the new
memberships of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, NATO
has become more of a political association and less of a purely
military organization.  In addition, OSCE stands every chance of
being used by the international community in the future as a
launching pad for preventive diplomacy, so that emerging crises
can be dealt with already in an early stage before they become
full-blown conflicts.
The security threats of a bipolar world with two military alliances
poised against one another appear to have abated with the
demise of one of the super-powers.  Our gain is that the danger
of world extermination through super-power nuclear warfare has
been averted.  Our loss is the relative clarity that this bipolarity
implied.  Now, instead, we are confronted with transnational
threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ter-
rorism, drug trafficking and organized crime.  These threats were
always there.  But, they have taken on new potency precisely
because of the demise of bipolarity and the concomitant emer-
gence of new states, some of which are still quite fragile.  Now the
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threats are more numerous, less visible, more underground and -
in an age of fast transportation and communication - much more
immediate.
And, here is where the current environment really does offer
something new:  transnational criminal and terrorist elements are
powerful enough to span the globe and emerge as virtual equals
to national entities.  Nowadays, it is not just the illicit activity itself
that crosses borders (like drugs or money laundering), it is the pur-
veyors themselves who control networks that ignore national
boundaries.
Viability of States
Today, criminality and corruption are truly transnational phenom-
ena.  Some organized crime networks are so large and powerful
that they have the capacity to hold an entire small state hostage,
to infiltrate government agencies and to merge illegitimate activi-
ties into legitimate enterprises.  Law enforcement agencies and
even intelligence services can be corrupted and their members co-
opted.
An even more insidious dimension of the problem, however, is
the corrosive effect on society at large.  There is the danger that
the population of a newly emerging state could begin to perceive
criminality and corruption as ineluctable elements in the process
of transition.  There are probably only two directions from such a
point once it is reached:  acceptance of criminality and corruption
as permanent elements in society, or rejection of the entire transi-
tion process and of democratization.
Neither path is positive.
Four Proposals
In the interests of successfully modernizing national intelligence
services, the author proposes four actions that can be undertaken
by individual governments and by the international community.
These are:  strengthening governmental and Parliamentary over-
sight;  enhancing salaries of intelligence operatives;  incorporat-
ing operatives into mainstream exchange and training programs;
and, initiating a program of special support to intelligence assets
of states in transition.
Let me describe each of these four proposals in more detail.
Strengthening government oversight
Traditionally, civilian oversight over is administered through
Parliamentary committees or through subordination to the highest
level of government officials, such as the Prime Minister or
President.  But such relationships place a tremendous burden on
these government officials.  They also presuppose the proper
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functioning of the highest levels of government.
Recommendation:  In order to assist newly emerging states
with this challenge, the U.S. and its Euro-Atlantic partners should
continue to provide assistance aimed at strengthening govern-
mental oversight over intelligence activities.  Specifically, we can
work together to ensure that Parliamentary committees, in many
states very rudimentary and weak, develop genuine oversight
capabilities.
Priority to salaries
Another aspect of the issue is the relatively low salaries paid to
employees of intelligence services in emerging democracies.
Obviously, intelligence operatives will be attractive targets to hos-
tile or criminal elements not only because the operatives possess
a needed trade-craft, but also because the outsiders often can
provide better remuneration for services than domestic agencies
in emerging states.
Recommendation:  Governments in new states should re-
examine the priority in salaries given to intelligence operatives.  At
the same time, international programs designed to provide budg-
et support to these states should take into consideration this cru-
cial area.
Education and training
Still another aspect of the challenge is in educational and training
opportunities for intelligence operatives and their superiors.
Ideally, an intelligence service and its employees should share in
the political and social commitment of the entire state through its
period of transition.  This cannot be achieved if the service’s oper-
atives are not well educated, or have gone through a training
process segregated from the population at large.
Recommendation:  Governments of emerging democracies
should strive to ensure that high-quality educational and training
opportunities are available to intelligence service employees.
Moreover, the international community - in its exchange programs
directed at states in transition - should not overlook the utility of
including intelligence service operatives.
Program of alternatives
Intelligence operatives in countries where the transition period is
incomplete, imperfect, or perhaps not succeeding at all, would
seem to make prime targets for hostile services, criminal and even
terrorist elements.  The expertise and trade-craft of these employ-
ees can be a valued commodity for international organized crime
networks and the services of unfriendly states.  In some countries,
this phenomenon is abetted by an overzealous democratization
process that expels intelligence operatives of a former regime for103
reasons of past affiliation. These former employees sometimes dis-
perse into society at large, where their talents are lost to future ver-
sions of their home services.  In addition, they are frequently not
able to make individual transitions smoothly into these new soci-
eties.  In other states, even if the operatives are retained in their
home services, they could suffer from low wages and lack of moti-
vation described above.
Recommendation:  In order to blunt the possible impact of this
problem, the Euro-Atlantic community should launch the same
sort of program the U.S. initiated for Russian nuclear scientists in
the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Under that
program, the U.S. provided millions of dollars, not so much in
direct wages as in alternative employment opportunities.  We
should do the same for valuable intelligence operatives in states
in transition.  Though some might dispute the overall success of
our program aimed at Soviet nuclear scientists, the principle
behind it stands as an outstanding example of an innovative pre-
ventive initiative designed to head off a potentially explosive prob-
lem.  As in the case of Russia’s nuclear scientists, there is a dark
side to the alternative:  if we do not initiate such a program, some-
one else - international organized crime or hostile services - will.
Conclusion
In sum, the future challenges for intelligence services in states in
transition posed by international organized crime and corruption
are real, potent and immediate.  They can erode the very fabric
of society, especially in a newly emerging democracy that is strug-
gling to adopt the political, economic and social reforms neces-
sary for becoming a modern state.  In some cases, they may even
be eroding the psychological support we in the West assume exists
among the populations of these states for reforms, democratiza-
tion and free market entrepreneurism.
Intelligence services are not immune to these corrosive process-
es.  Given the special advisory role these services play in every
government, it would seem prudent for us all to consider ways to
strengthen their professionalism.
In the end, they may be no stronger than the states they serve.
But, they can provide significant support for the positive directions
a state and its people have chosen to go.
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